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Introduction
How do individuals form inflation expectations? The answer to this question is of central importance for policy makers. Inflation expectations are viewed as a key determinant of inflation (Bernanke, 2007 , Yellen, 2015 . Furthermore, in Japan, the United States, and Europe, policies that raise inflation expectations have been proposed as policies to stimulate spending when interest rates are at the effective lower bound. Hence, theoretical and empirical research on expectation formation has been an important input into policy-making. 1 A question that seems equally important is: Do agents' inflation expectations affect their choices? According to theories that have had a large impact on policy-making in practice, there is a tight link between inflation expectations and choices (e.g., the consumption Euler equation and the New Keynesian Phillips curve in New Keynesian models), but empirically it is still an open question whether there exists such a tight link between inflation expectations and choices, and only if inflation expectations do affect choices, we care about how inflation expectations are formed in the first place.
The key innovation of the paper is that we can link survey data on inflation expectations at the household level and administrative data on income, assets, and liabilities. The survey data on inflation expectations are already interesting, because they are longitudinal data for households.
We use the Dutch Household Survey. The survey aims to be representative for the Dutch population. Every year households are asked to forecast prices for the next year. Households participate for several years. Since we can track individual households over time, we can study how individual households update inflation expectations over time. Most papers studying how individuals update inflation expectations over time use either a survey of professional forecasters or the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, but professional forecasters do not appear prominently in Macroeconomic models and households are surveyed at most twice in the Michigan Survey of Consumers. We therefore begin the paper by investigating how households update inflation expectations over time. We find that a model in which households believe annual inflation follows a first-order autoregressive process and households pay limited attention to current inflation to forecast future inflation matches aggregate updating patterns well. The simplest version of the model however cannot match the large cross-sectional heterogeneity in inflation expectations and the high persistence in households' relative views. We therefore generalize the benchmark model by allowing households to believe that official inflation statistics are biased. Heterogeneity in this perceived bias raises both heterogeneity in inflation expectations and persistence in households' relative views.
In the second part, we turn to the key question of the paper: Do agents' inflation expectations affect their choices? We exploit the fact that the same survey (the DNB Household Survey) contains questions on inflation expectations and questions on assets and liabilities. In addition, we exploit the fact that one can match the microdata from the DNB Household Survey with administrative data on income and wealth at the household level. We obtain several novel findings. First, households with higher inflation expectations have lower net worth (assets minus liabilities). Second, households with higher inflation expectations have less assets and less liabilities, for a given net worth. Third, households with higher inflation expectations hold less of all non-liquid assets (savings account, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, and housing). In other words, households with higher inflation expectations accumulate less wealth, are less leveraged, and invest less in non-liquid assets.
There exist only a few papers that study the relationship between inflation expectations and choices by households using microdata. Most papers in this literature examine the relationship between quantitative inflation expectations and answers to qualitative questions on "readiness to spend" (Bachmann et Armantier et al. (2015) find that inflation expectations co-move in a meaningful way with investment choices in a financially incentivized field experiment. Finally, Malmendier and Nagel (2016) investigate the relationship between their model-implied inflation expectations and financial decisions reported in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) at the cohort level. We take a different and complementary approach to the existing papers in this literature. We link microdata on inflation expectations for the period 1993-2016 to administrative data on income, assets, and liabilities at the household level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the survey data on inflation expectations and the core results on how individual households update inflation expectations over time. Section 3 introduces the administrative data on income, assets, and liabilities, explains the linking of the two data sets, and investigates whether households' inflation expectations affect their choices. Section 4 concludes.
Inflation Expectations of Households
In this section, we investigate how households update inflation expectations over time. We present the model, the data, descriptive statistics, and a comparison between a quantitative version of the model and the data.
Model
In the model, households believe annual inflation follows an AR(1) process, households pay limited attention to current inflation to forecast future inflation, and households may believe that official inflation statistics are biased.
Households' perceived law of motion for inflation is
where π t is the inflation rate in year t, ρ ∈ (−1, 1] is the autocorrelation coefficient, c ∈ R determines the unconditional expectation of inflation, and
In every period, household i observes a signal about current inflation which, according to the household, is generated as follows
where
is the noise in the signal, with μ i ∈ R and σ 2 ε ≥ 0. The mean μ i captures the idea that the household may believe that official inflation statistics are biased. The variance σ 2 ε captures the idea that the household may be aware of the fact that he or she is paying limited attention to current inflation. The perceived μ i and the perceived σ 2 ε affect how the household interprets the signals, s it , that the household receives. We assume that the household uses the steady-state Kalman filter to compute conditional expectations of future inflation.
The aforementioned assumptions imply the following equation for inflation expectations
A household's forecast in year t depends on an individual-specific intercept, the household's forecast in the previous year, the realized inflation rate, and a term that is linear in the noise in the signal.
To derive equation (3), note that equation (1) (after deducting c on both sides) is the state equation and equation (2) (after deducting c + μ i on both sides) is the observation equation in a state-space representation of the dynamics of the signal. The household first deducts the perceived bias μ i from the signal to transform the signal into an unbiased signal about current inflation. It follows from the standard equations for the steady-state Kalman filter that the nowcast for inflation is given by
or equivalently
The nowcast for inflation is a linear combination of the household's prior mean and the product of the Kalman gain K and the difference between the signal realization and the expected signal realization. The Kalman gain is an increasing function of the perceived signal-to-noise ratio, σ 2 u /σ 2 ε . Furthermore, the perceived law of motion for inflation implies that the forecast for inflation is a weighted average of the unconditional mean and the nowcast for inflation 2
Combining the last two equations yields
Finally, if the signal s it is indeed a linear combination of the current inflation rate and noise, we obtain equation (3) for the inflation forecast of household i in year t. 3 In sum, the model where households pay limited attention to current inflation to forecast future inflation and believe official inflation statistics may be biased predicts that
Here π t+1|t,i = E[π t+1 |I i,t ] is the forecast of household i in year t, π t|t−1,i is the forecast of the same household in year t − 1, and β 0,i = (1 − ρ) c − ρKμ i , β 1 = ρ (1 − K), β 2 = ρK, and ν it = ρKε it . 4 Before turning to the survey data on inflation expectations, it is worth pointing out that two other models of forecasts also yield equation (4) . First, Patton and Timmermann (2010) propose and estimate a model in which professional forecasters shrink the data-based forecast towards some other individual-specific view. According to their model, the forecast of agent i in year t is a weighted average of the conditional expectation, E[π t+1 |I i,t ], and some other individual-specific view, ξ i ,
If the conditional expectation is given by equation (3), then the forecast is given by equation (4) with
and
Second, suppose that households misunderstand the survey question on inflation expectations and submit forecasts for inflation rates at the household level. 5 If households' perceived law of motion for aggregate inflation is given by equation (1), their perceived law of motion for household inflation is aggregate inflation plus a constant, π it = π t +δ i , and households pay limited attention to current household inflation to forecast future household inflation, s it = π it +ε it , then the conditional expectation of future household inflation is given by
Furthermore, if the actual law of motion for household inflation has the form π it = π t + ζ it , where ζ it may or may not coincide with δ i , then the forecast of household i in year t is given by equation
Equation (4) for individual forecasts also yields predictions for the cross-sectional average of forecasts and the persistence of relative views. Suppose that there are N households in the population. Summing across i on both sides of equation (4) and dividing by N yields
4 The model also predicts that β 1 + β 2 = ρ and β 2 /β 1 = K/ (1 − K) > 0. 5 Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2016) use scanner data to estimate inflation rates at the household level.
The average forecast in year t depends on the average intercept, the average forecast in year t − 1, the realized inflation rate in year t, and the average noise in the signal in year t. Deducting the last equation from the previous equation yields
The relative view of household i in year t depends on the relative intercept, the relative view of the household in the previous year, and the relative noise in the household's signal in year t. Note that heterogeneity in views has two sources: the individual-specific intercept, which has a permanent effect on relative views, and the individual-specific noise, which has a temporary effect on relative views (with persistence that depends on the parameter β 1 ).
Data
The inflation expectations microdata is from the DNB Household Survey, conducted annually since Survey also contain very detailed information on assets, liabilities, and mortgages. We return to this point in Section 3, where we study administrative and survey data on income, assets, and liabilities.
Beginning with the 2008 wave, the main quantitative question on inflation expectations is:
"What is the most likely (consumer) prices increase over the next twelve months, do you think?" Possible answers are:
1%, 2%, 3%, . . . , 10%
Respondents are then asked four questions regarding their subjective CDF:
"Of course it is difficult to predict on forehand how much (consumer) prices will increase.
Therefore we would like to ask you how sure you are about your prediction." 6 "How likely do you think that it is that the increase (in percent) in prices in the next twelve months will be less than [Y1]%?" "How likely do you think that it is that the increase (in percent) in prices in the next twelve months will be less than [Y2]%?" "How likely do you think that it is that the increase (in percent) in prices in the next twelve months will be more than "We now would like to learn what you expect will happen to the prices in the next twelve months. What will be the minimum percentage prices could increase over the next twelve months, do you think? If you think prices will decrease, you can fill in a negative percentage by using a minus in front of the number."
"What is the maximum percentage prices will increase over the next twelve months, do you think?" 6 The values of Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4 in the following four questions depend on the answers given to the first question.
Calling the answers MIN and MAX, the respondents were asked 4 questions, with i ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}:
"How likely do you think that it is that the increase in prices in the next twelve months will be less than
?"
For the intermediate years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , where households were only asked for their subjective CDF, we estimate the mean of the subjective CDF using a piece-wise linear interpolation over the probability density function.
Results
We now present descriptive statistics for the survey data on inflation expectations and compare a quantitative version of the model presented in Section 2.1 to the data described in Section 2.2. However, the large majority of respondents made a very good forecast that year: 2/3 of households answered 2% or 3% in 2012, and CPI inflation turned out to be 2.5% in 2013.
In Figure 2 , we illustrate the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of inflation expectations over time. The cross-sectional distribution of inflation expectations for year t is described by the 10th percentile (dots), the 90th percentile (small dashes), and the mean (large dashes). We also plot the time series for realized CPI inflation (solid line). To facilitate comparison between expectations and realization, the four numbers reported for year t refer to the distribution of forecasts made in year t-1 for year t and the realization in year t. The vertical lines mark changes in the survey questions. Clearly, there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in answers in all years. Furthermore, the cross-sectional mean of reported inflation expectations moves to some extent with realized inflation.
Turning to the vertical lines, the changes in the survey questions did not coincide with unusual changes in the cross-sectional mean of reported inflation expectations, but they do seem to coincide with small changes in the cross-sectional heterogeneity in reported inflation expectations. The panel component of the survey data allows us to track individual households over time.
Hence, we can investigate how individual households update their inflation expectations over time.
Several thousand households participated in the survey. It is difficult to visualize several thousand paths for the reported inflation expectation. We therefore present transition matrices. In Table 1, we study the answers of all households with at least two consecutive answers. (More precisely, we study the answers of all households with an answer in the year after the first answer.) The entries are conditional probabilities. The first row of Table 1 contains the relative frequency of different answers in year two given that the answer in year one was 1%. The second row contains the relative frequency of different answers in year two given that the answer in year one was 2%, and so on.
The five entries in each row sum to one. The diagonal entries in Table 1 are 0.47, 0.42, 0.33, 0.36, and 0.30. Hence, roughly 1/3 of households gave the same answer in year two as in year one (the fraction is somewhat higher for initial low answers and somewhat lower for initial high answers).
In Table 2 , we repeat the exercise for all households with at least three consecutive answers.
(More precisely, we repeat the exercise for all households with observations in both years after the first observation). The first panel reports the transition probabilities comparing answers in years one and two. The second panel reports the transition probabilities comparing answers in years two and three. The third panel reports the transition probabilities comparing directly answers in years one and three. The two one-year transition matrices reported in Table 2 look similar to the one-year transition matrix reported in Table 1 . This is interesting, but the most striking finding is in the last panel of Table 1 . The (1,1) entry of the third panel of Table 2 ("1 to 3") is much larger 7 For policy implications of a New Keynesian model with a zero lower bound and dispersed information generating sticky and heterogeneous inflation expectations, see Wiederholt (2015) .
than the product of row one of panel one and column one of panel two. This means the answers do not follow a Markov process with common transition probabilities. In particular, a household has a higher probability of going from an answer of 2% in year two to an answer of 1% in year three if the household already answered 1% in year one. The same observation applies to the other diagonal entries of the third panel of Table 2 . Households seem to have individual-specific attractors for the reported inflation expectation to which they return. Table 3 confirms this finding. In Table 3 , we repeat the exercise for all households with at least four consecutive answers. (More precisely, we repeat the exercise for all households with three observations in the three years after the first observation). The different panels in the table are the three one-year transition matrices and the transition matrix comparing directly the answers in years one and four. Again the diagonal entries of the last transition matrix ("1 to 4") are much larger than the probabilities implied by a Markov process with common transition probabilities and the one-year transition matrices reported in the first three panels. Households tend to return to individual-specific attractors after they have moved away. To identify this feature of the data, one needs more than two observations per household.
In sum, there is large cross-sectional heterogeneity in reported inflation expectations, the crosssectional mean of reported inflation expectations moves to some extent with realized inflation, and reported inflation expectations seem to have individual-specific attractors.
The model presented in Section 2.1 can match all three features of the data. We now perform a comparison of a quantitative version of the model and the data. To be as transparent as possible,
we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate equation (5) with the time series for the cross-sectional mean of inflation expectations and the time series for inflation. 8 This yields estimates ofβ 0 , β 1 , β 2 , andν t . Recall thatβ 0 andν t are the cross-sectional averages of β 0,i and ν it , respectively. Second, we estimate the actual law of motion for inflation using the same time series for inflation as in step 1. Third, we make an assumption about the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of β 0,i , and we make an assumption about the variance of the idiosyncratic component of ν it : (i) β 0,i has a log-normal distribution, and (ii) the variance ofν it ≡ ν it −ν t equals twice the variance ofν t .
We choose the parameters of the log-normal distribution to match the cross-sectional variance of 8 The two time series are plotted in Figure 2 .
inflation expectations in 2012. 9 This completes our choice of parameters.
With these parameters, we simulate data for inflation expectations using equation (4) and the actual law of motion for inflation, and we compute transition matrices for reported inflation expectations from the simulated data. 10 Table 4 shows the results for estimation of equation (5) with the time series for the crosssectional mean of inflation expectations and the time series for inflation. 11 The estimates of β 1 and β 2 approximately sum to one. According to the model presented in Section 2.1, β 1 + β 2 = ρ and thus β 1 + β 2 = 1 means households' perceived law of motion for inflation is a random walk.
Dividing the estimate of β 1 by the estimate of β 2 yields a value around 1.5. According to the model presented in Section 2.1, β 1 /β 2 = (1 − K) /K and thus β 1 /β 2 = 1.5 means the Kalman gain is 0.4. Table 5 shows the results for estimation of an AR(1) for inflation using data for the period 1984-2016. 12 The point estimate of the coefficient on lagged inflation is 0.59 and the point estimate of the constant is 0.72. The estimated variance of the innovation equals 0.76.
Hence, according to the model and these estimates, households believe inflation is more persistent than it actually is (the perceived autocorrelation coefficient for inflation is close to 1 not 0.6) and households pay limited attention to current inflation to forecast future inflation (the estimated Kalman gain is 0.4 not 1).
Next, we turn to the cross-sectional distribution of inflation expectations by households. We set the parameters of the log-normal distribution for β 0,i to obtain a cross-sectional mean of β 0,i of 0.40 and a cross-sectional variance of β 0,i of 0.33. For these values, the cross-sectional mean of β 0,i equals the estimated value reported in the first column of Table 4 , and the cross-sectional standard deviation of inflation expectations equals (on average across time and simulations) the value reported in Figure 1 . This completes our choice of parameters. With these model parameters,
we simulate time series for individual inflation expectations. 9 This variance is reported in Figure 1 . 10 We assume that agents with inflation expectations below 1.5% say 1%, agents with inflation expectations in the interval [1.5%, 2.5%) say 2%, and so on. 11 The first column uses inflation expectations as reported by households, where the survey question is asked in three different ways as reported in Section 2.2. The second column adjusts inflation expectations to the same format of the most recent question. Results are similar. In both columns, the inflation data are the official annual inflation data published by Statistics Netherlands. 12 The inflation data are again the official annual inflation data published by Statistics Netherlands. Tables 6-8 show the transition matrices computed from the simulated data. The simulated transition matrices are close to the empirical transition matrices (Tables 1-3 ). There are two features of the data that the model currently misses. First, the diagonal elements in Tables 6-8 for 4-5% and 6% or more are too high. The high diagonal elements for 6% or more are probably due to the fact that the assumption of a log-normal distribution for β 0,i creates some very high inflation expectations that have a small probability of being revised to much lower values. Second, the (1,1) elements in Tables 6-8 decline somewhat too fast going from Table 6 to Table 7 to Table 8 . This is probably due to the assumption that the variance ofν it ≡ ν it −ν t equals twice the variance of ν t . A smaller variance ofν it would generate less heterogeneity in inflation expectations fromν it and more heterogeneity in inflation expectations from β 0,i . Recall from equation (6) 
Choices of households
In this section, we report novel results on the relationship between inflation expectations and financial decisions of households.
Data
We exploit the fact that the same survey (the DNB Household Survey) contains questions on inflation expectations and questions on assets and liabilities. The purpose of the DNB Household Survey is to study the economic and psychological determinants of the saving behavior of households. The survey therefore also contains very detailed information on household characteristics.
The survey has been conducted annually since 1993 and is administered by CentERdata, a survey research institute at Tilburg University that specializes on Internet surveys. The survey aims to be representative for the Dutch population. Households participate for as long as they want. The survey is refreshed with new households.
Moreover, Statistics Netherlands provides income and wealth measures based on administrative data. Furthermore, Statistics Netherlands provides a working environment, where we could merge the microdata from the DNB Household Survey with the administrative data at the household level. 13 This allows us, for example, to link the inflation expectation reported by household j in year t to the wealth held in checking and savings accounts by household j in year t, as reported by banks. The following two paragraphs provide more information on the income and wealth measures based on administrative data.
We use disposable household income, which is the sum of labor income, business income, and interest income (including use of the own home), plus transfers and alimony, minus taxes and health insurance premiums. Not measured (or imputed) are income transfers within the family, income transfers abroad, black market income, and alimony to children.
Wealth is measured from several administrative sources, coming from the tax authorities and banks. The Netherlands has a tax on interest income, which is calculated as a fixed rate on the average holdings of cash, checking and savings accounts, stocks and bonds, real estate not being the primary residence, minus debt (including study loans, excluding mortgages for the primary residence). Since there is a threshold of 20,000 euro of wealth for the interest income tax (double the amount for couples), from tax records alone only higher wealth levels would be observed. For households not reporting interest income tax, Statistics Netherlands imputes wealth holdings based on dividend and interest income. Furthermore, banks report wealth held in checking and savings accounts. The value of stocks and bonds is the market value at the beginning of January of a year.
Other asset variables include housing value (based for tax purposes, which is correlated with but not necessarily equal to market value), stock ownership in substantial holdings, and business equity.
On the liability side the mortgage value of the own home and the sum of other loans (including study loans) are reported.
Results
We begin by studying the survey data on assets and liabilities. These data are self reported. Table   9 provides summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis. We use data from all survey waves (1993-2016). We have information for 6,921 unique households and the total number of observations per variable is 26,492. Table 10 studies the relationship between inflation expectations and assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the first column, we regress the value of all assets of the household on the inflation 13 Statistics Netherlands checks all outputs to guarantee anonymity of households.
expectation of the household. 14 We control for income, education, a number of other household characteristics, and regional characteristics. We also include time fixed effects. In the third column,
we regress the value of all liabilities of the household on the inflation expectation of the household.
In the fifth column, we regress the net worth of the household on the inflation expectation of the household. In columns two, four, and six, we include a financial literacy index as a control. 15 We obtain three novel findings. Households with higher inflation expectations have less assets, less liabilities, and lower net worth.
In Table 11 we study the relationship between inflation expectations and ownership of assets. In each column, the dependent variable is whether or not the household owns a certain type of asset.
The control variables are the same as in Table 10 . Households with higher inflation expectations are less likely to own a savings account, mutual funds, bonds, stocks, and a house (with and without controlling for net worth). Table 12 investigates the relationship between inflation expectations and asset values. In each column, the dependent variable is the total value of a certain type of asset. The control variables are the same as in Table 10 . We find that households with higher inflation expectations hold less of all non-liquid assets (with and without controlling for net worth).
In sum, the coefficient on expected inflation is negative in every single regression reported in Tables 10-12 . In all regressions, we control for income, education, a number of other household characteristics, and regional characteristics. We also include time fixed effects. We obtain several novel findings: Households with higher inflation expectations have lower net worth; they have less assets and less liabilities; and they hold less of all non-liquid assets (savings account, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, and housing), with and without controlling for net worth. In other words, households with higher inflation expectations have accumulated less wealth, they hold smaller gross positions (i.e., they are less leveraged), and they avoid non-liquid assets.
Next, we turn to the administrative data. As pointed out before, Statistics Netherlands provides income and wealth measures based on administrative data and Statistics Netherlands provides a 14 Whenever possible we use the inflation expectation of the household head. In the case of a missing value, we use the inflation expectation of the spouse. The variables "female", "retired", "college education", and "age" all refer to the household head. "Children in the house" is a dummy variable. 15 Financial literacy is measured in 2005. We use the basic financial literacy index described in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011).
working environment, where one can merge the microdata from surveys with the administrative data at the household level. We merged the microdata from the DNB Household Survey (DHS) with the administrative data. We also merged the microdata from another survey, the Consumer Confidence Survey (CCO), with the administrative data. 16 Households were asked in 2011 to 2014
whether they agreed to be matched. 88% of the households appearing in our DHS sample agreed to be matched. For those households, we looked at all observations going back to the year 2008. 17 The resulting sample contains 7,969 observations per variable for 2,134 unique households. In a second step, we add the CCO sample to the DHS sample. The CCO data are cross-sectional data.
The CCO data are available for the years 2012-2014. Pooling the DHS sample and the CCO sample results in 24,534 observations per variable for 18,698 unique households.
The second part of Table 9 provides summary statistics for the administrative data. Comparing the summary statistics for the survey data and the summary statistics for the administrative data suggests that stock ownership is underreported in the survey data (11% in the DHS survey versus 35% in the administrative data) and that liabilities are also underreported in the survey data (58% in the DHS survey versus 67% in the administrative data). Table 13 studies the relationship between inflation expectations and assets, liabilities, and net worth. It repeats the analysis of Table 10 with the administrative data. The coefficient on inflation expectations is negative and significant in all regressions. Households with higher inflation expectations have less assets, less liabilities, and lower net worth. Table 14 investigates the relationship between inflation expectations and ownership of assets.
It repeats the analysis of Table 11 with the administrative data. The coefficient on inflation expectations is negative and statistically significant for bonds, stocks, and home ownership. Households with higher inflation expectations are less likely to own bonds, stocks, and a house (with and without controlling for net worth). A comment on columns one and five is in order. The administrative 16 The Consumer Confidence Survey (CCO), which is done partly at the request of the European Commission, data does not contain separate information for checking accounts and savings accounts. Therefore, the dependent variable in columns one and five is whether the household owns a checking account or a savings account. The mean dependent variable in both columns is 99%, and whether a household belongs to the remaining 1% is not linked to inflation expectations.
Finally, in Table 15 , we study the relationship between inflation expectations and asset values.
The coefficient on inflation expectations is negative and statistically significant in all regressions, with the exception of the bonds regression for the DHS sample. 18 
Conclusion
To understand how households form inflation expectations, we study longitudinal data on inflation expectations for the period 1993-2016. We find that there is large cross-sectional heterogeneity in reported inflation expectations, reported inflation expectations move to some extent with realized inflation, and there seem to exist individual-specific attractors for reported inflation expectations.
We consider a simple model in which households believe annual inflation follows a first-order autoregressive process, households may pay limited attention to current inflation to forecast future inflation, and households may believe official inflation statistics are biased. The model matches the data well once one allows for three deviations from the theoretical benchmark of full-information, rational expectations: (i) households believe inflation is more persistent than it actually is, (ii) households pay limited attention to current inflation, and (iii) households differ in the degree to which they trust official inflation statistics.
Survey data on household inflation expectations is sometimes criticized by arguing that it is probably unrelated to anything that households actually do. This criticism was feasible, because relatively little was known about the empirical relationship between reported inflation expectations and choices of households. To address this criticism, we study the empirical relationship between reported inflation expectations and a broad range of financial decisions of households. We exploit the fact that the same survey (the DNB Household Survey) contains questions on inflation expectations and questions on assets and liabilities. In addition, we exploit the fact that one can match the microdata from the DNB Household Survey with administrative data on income and wealth at the household level. We obtain several novel findings. First, households with higher inflation expectations have lower net worth (assets minus liabilities). Second, households with higher inflation expectations have less assets and less liabilities, for a given net worth. Third, households with higher inflation expectations hold less of all non-liquid assets (savings account, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, and housing). In other words, households with higher inflation expectations accumulate less wealth, are less leveraged, and invest less in non-liquid assets. These empirical findings seem relevant for Macroeconomics, Finance, and monetary policy. Both columns are estimated with OLS (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors reported in parentheses). The first column uses inflation expectations as reported by households, where the survey question is asked in three different ways as reported in the text. The second column adjusts inflation expectations to the same format of the most recent question. The standard errors of the structural parameters are estimated with the Delta method. Average realized inflation in this period is 1.95%. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. 
N observations 32
The coefficients are estimated with OLS (heteroskedasticity robust standard errors reported in parentheses). */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. All columns are estimated with OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual. Year fixed effects are included, but not reported. Dependent variables are divided by a 1,000. Income is transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in order to incorporate negative and zero values. The baseline for urbanization is "Very high urbanization". Financial literacy is measured in 2005. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. All columns are estimated with linear probability models (OLS), and standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual. Year fixed effects are included, but not reported. Income and net worth are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in order to incorporate negative and zero values. Each column contains 26,492 observations for 6,921 unique households. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. All columns are estimated with OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Year fixed effects are included, but not reported. Income and net worth are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in order to incorporate negative and zero values. Each column contains 26,492 observations for 6,921 unique households. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. All columns are estimated with OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual. Year fixed effects are included, but not reported. Dependent variables are divided by a 1,000. Income is transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in order to incorporate negative and zero values. The baseline for urbanization is "Very high urbanization". The pooled sample has 24,534 observations for 18,698 unique households. The DHS sample contains 7,969 observations for 2,134 households. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. All columns are estimated with linear probability models (OLS), and standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual. Year fixed effects are included, but not reported. The pooled sample has 24,534 observations for 18,698 unique households. The DHS sample contains 7,969 observations for 2,134 households. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%. All columns are estimated with OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Year fixed effects are included, but not reported. The pooled sample has 24,534 observations for 18,698 unique households. The DHS sample contains 7,969 observations for 2,134 households. */**/*** correspond to 10%/5%/1%.
